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ABSTRACT
Changes in fiscal policy typically entail two kinds of lags: the legislative lag—between when legislation
is proposed and when it is signed into law—and the implementation lag—from when a new fiscal
law is enacted and when it takes effect. These lags imply that substantial time evolves between when
news arrives about fiscal changes and when the changes actually take place—time when households
and firms can adjust their behavior. We identify two types of fiscal news—government spending and
changes in tax policy—and map the news processes into standard DSGE models. We identify news
concerning taxes through the municipal bond market. If asset markets are efficient, the yield spread
between tax-exempt municipal bonds and treasuries should be a function of the news concerning changes
in tax policy. We identify news concerning government spending through the Survey of Professional
Forecasters. We conclude that news concerning fiscal variables is a time-varying process that can have
important qualitative and quantitative effects.
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1 Introduction
Through a variety of not easily quantiﬁed sources—news reports, television, the internet,
word-of-mouth—economic agents acquire foresight about future variables that are impor-
tant to their decisions. Forward-looking decision-makers react to this news even before the
variables are realized.
Much of the recent work on foresight involves news about future changes in technology,1
but ﬁscal policy provides a more tangible example. Changes in ﬁscal policy typically entail
two kinds of lags: the legislative lag—between when legislation is proposed and when it
is signed into law—and the implementation lag—from when a new ﬁscal law is enacted
and when it takes eﬀect. These lags imply that substantial time evolves between when
news arrives about ﬁscal changes and when the changes actually take place—time when
households and ﬁrms can adjust their behavior. Although researchers have recognized that
economic agents might change their behavior in anticipation of not-yet-realized tax changes
[Hall (1971), Judd (1985), Branson, Fraga, and Johnson (1986), Poterba (1988), Sims (1988),
Leeper (1989)], the theoretical and empirical implications of such foresight are only beginning
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1For example, Beaudry and Portier (2006), Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2008) Jaimovich and
Rebelo (2009), Comin, Gertler, and Santacreu (2008), Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani (2008), Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2010), and Leeper and Walker (2010).to be studied [Yang (2005), Kriwoluzky (2009), Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008, 2009),
Mertens and Ravn (2008, 2009), Fisher and Peters (2009), Ramey (2010), Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2010)].
Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009) and Leeper and Walker (2010) emphasize that the
quantitative eﬀects of foresight depend critically on the information process governing the
news. In principle, when the information ﬂows are modeled “correctly” and then embedded
into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, it is possible to obtain accurate
qualitative predictions of the eﬀects of ﬁscal news (conditional on the DSGE model). Fiscal
foresight and “news shocks,” however, are generally diﬃcult to pin down. The news process
imbedded into a DSGE model must be imposed by the modeler and is therefore prone to
misspeciﬁcation. Leeper and Walker (2010) show that slight modiﬁcations to information
processes governing foresight can lead to substantial changes in equilibrium outcomes.
Fiscal foresight creates special problems for structural VARs because it can produce equi-
librium time series with a non-fundamental moving average component that misaligns the
agents’ and the econometrician’s information sets [Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008)]. Dif-
ﬁculties associated with non-fundamental moving average representations in macro models
were described by Hansen and Sargent (1980, 1991) and recently reiterated by Fern´ andez-
Villaverde, Rubio-Ram´ ırez, Sargent, and Watson (2007). Economically meaningful shocks
typically cannot be extracted from statistical innovations in conventional ways without mak-
ing strong and unveriﬁable assumptions about information ﬂows. Conventional econometric
tools can yield false inferences by confounding shocks and incorrectly estimating dynamics.
These diﬃculties suggest that one must be especially careful when examining foresight.
The primary contribution of the paper is to methodically construct a news process for
ﬁscal foresight from data. We identify news about tax policy changes through the use of
municipal bonds (see section 3.1). If asset markets are eﬃcient, the yield spread between
tax-exempt municipal bonds and treasury bonds should reﬂect the anticipated change in tax
rates. We also identify news about changes in government spending following the approach
described in Ramey (2010, 2009). Ramey argues forcefully that at times signiﬁcant changes
in government spending are well anticipated. We use the Survey of Professional Forecasters
to back out the amount of ﬁscal foresight contained in government spending. After char-
acterizing these information ﬂows as autoregressive moving-average processes, we feed the
two sources of ﬁscal policy news into two canonical DSGE models. The paper makes the
following additional contributions:
• We ﬁnd that news concerning changes in ﬁscal policy is a time-varying process. There
are periods in which agents have many quarters of foresight (e.g., wars, signiﬁcant
changes to the tax code). Over the time horizon that we examine, these “high foresight”
2periods are few and far between. Much of data consists of medium to low or no
foresight. One consequence of this result is that models that do not take the time
varying process of information ﬂows into account will average away the eﬀects of news.
These studies might conclude that ﬁscal foresight is not relevant for explaining business
cycle dynamics, but these models will not be able to assess the eﬀects of ﬁscal foresight.
• We examine ﬁscal foresight in Braun’s (1994) real business cycle model and Traum and
Yang’s (2009) new Keynesian model. These models are selected because they represent
conventional models used for policy analysis and because they have been ﬁt to U.S.
data. We augment these models with foresight and ﬁnd that foresight can have both
quantitative and qualitative eﬀects on short- and medium-run dynamics. Alternative
news processes substantially alter equilibrium dynamics, underscoring the importance
of accurately characterizing the stochastic processes governing ﬁscal news.
• We show how foresight interacts with common frictions imbedded in models to better
ﬁt data. Internal propagation mechanisms, such as habit formation, are shown to
propagate the eﬀects of foresight. For example, without habit formation, the eﬀects
of news about government spending or changes in tax policy are relatively short lived
vis-´ a-vis the model that includes habit formation.
2T w o D S G E M o d e l s
In this section we brieﬂy describe the real business cycle (RBC) model and new Keyne-
sian (NK) model used in the analysis. The two models represent very diﬀerent modeling
strategies. Whereas the RBC model contains no frictions, the NK model includes invest-
ment adjustment costs, variable capital utilization rates, and sticky prices and wages. Stark
diﬀerences in structure can imply very diﬀerent impacts of ﬁscal news. In addition, the
NK model contains more ﬁscal detail, government debt dynamics, and a speciﬁcation of
monetary policy behavior, which aﬀect the transmission mechanism of ﬁscal news.
2.1 Real Business Cycle Model Following Braun (1994), we employ a conventional
real business cycle model with an elastic labor supply, additively-separable log preferences,
and proportional taxes levied against both capital and labor earnings, which are used to
ﬁnance government spending and transfers to households. Preferences over consumption
and leisure are given by E0
∞
t=0 βt[lnct + γ2 ln(1 −  t)], where ct = cpt + γ1Gt and  t
denotes individual labor. Households derive utility from both private consumption, cpt,a n d
public consumption, Gt, where the relative weight is governed by γ1. The household budget
3constraint is
cpt + kt ≤ kt−1 +( 1− τ
L
t )wt t +( 1− τ
L
t )(1 − τ
K
t )(rt − δ)kt−1 + TR t, (1)
where kt denotes the household’s capital stock, rt is the rental rate on capital, δ is the
depreciation rate on capital, wt is the wage rate, TR t are transfers from the government to
the household, and τL
t and τK
t are labor and capital taxes levied on the household. The
unconventional speciﬁcation for capital taxes reﬂects the presence of double taxation of
capital income.
The ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts subject to Yt = Kθ
t−1(Ltzt)1−θ,w h e r eKt−1 and Lt denote the
per capita capital stock and labor supply and zt is a productivity shock that follows
ln(zt) = ln(zt−1) + ln(λt),
where λt follows an AR(1) process.
The government budget constraint is
τ
L
t wtLt +( τ
L
t + τ
K
t − τ
L
t τ
K
t )(rt − δ)Kt−1 = Gt + TR t. (2)
We assume ﬁscal variables are governed by the following ARMA(1,q) processes:
ˆ τ
K
t = ρKˆ τ
K
t−1 +
q 
i=0
θ
K
i εK,t−j (3)
ˆ τ
L
t = ρLˆ τ
L
t−1 +
q 
i=0
θ
L
i εL,t−j (4)
ˆ Gt = ρG ˆ Gt−1 +
q 
i=0
θ
G
i εG,t−j, (5)
where a circumﬂex denotes a log-deviation from the deterministic steady-state. The moving-
average coeﬃcients, the θ’s, will be used to model the news process. We describe this in
more detail in section 4.
2.2 New Keynesian Model We adopt a conventional new Keynesian model based on
Traum and Yang (2010) that incorporates several features that have become standard in the
literature.
The model includes two types of households: savers, denoted by S, who have access to a
complete set of contingent claims, and non-savers, denoted by N, who each period consume
their entire disposable income. A fraction μ ∈ [0,1] of the population is savers and the
4remaining 1 − μ fraction is non-savers. The continuum of agents have common preferences,
as represented by those of agent j ∈ [0,1]
E0
∞ 
t=0
β
tu
b
t

cA
t (j)1−γ − 1
1 − γ
−
LA
t (j)1+κ
1+κ

(6)
for A ∈{ S,N},w h e r e0<β<1 is the household’s discount rate, γ ≥ 0 is the constant
of relative risk-aversion, κ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and ub
t is
a preference shock. cA
t (j)a n dLA
t (j) are, respectively, consumption of the ﬁnal good and
the quantity of labor supplied at time t by agent j. Each individual agent’s labor input,
  ∈ [0,1], is supplied in a monopolistically competitive setting. The total amount of labor
supplied by household j satisﬁes LA
t (j)=
 1
0  A
t (j, )d ,w h e r e A
t (j, ) is the amount of labor
of input type   supplied by agent j of type A.
The budget constraint for saver j ∈ (0,1 − μ)i s
Ht(j)+( 1− τ
K
t )
RK
t vt(j)kt−1(j)
Pt
+
Rt−1bt−1(j)
πt
= c
S
t (j)+
it(j)
1+τC
t
+ bt(j), (7)
where bt(j)a n dkt(j) denote the level of nominal riskless government bonds and the stock of
capital carried into period t+1,Pt is the after-tax consumer price level, Rt and πt = Pt/Pt−1
are the gross nominal interest rate on bonds purchased at time t and the gross inﬂation
rate, and τL
t , τK
t ,a n dτC
t are taxes levied against labor income, the return on capital, and
consumption. The presence of consumption taxes distinguishes the producer price index, ¯ P,
from the consumer price index, Pt =( 1+τC
t ) ¯ Pt. The term Ht(j) represents individual j’s
human wealth (net labor income) and is given by
Ht(j) ≡ (1 − τ
L
t )
 l
0
Wt( )
Pt
 
S
t (j, )d  + zt(j)+dt(j), (8)
where Wt( ) is the nominal wage for labor type  , zt(j) are government transfers, and dt(j)
denotes the share of nominal ﬁrm proﬁts received in the form of dividends by agent j.T h e
law of motion for capital is given by
kt(j)=( 1− δ[vt(j)])kt−1(j)+

1 − s

ui
tit(j)
it−1(j)
	
it(j), (9)
where ui
t is an exogenous eﬃciency shock and s(·) is the investment adjustment cost function
that satisﬁes the properties s(1) = s (1) = 0 and s  (1) ≡ s>0. The depreciation rate, δ,i s
5positively related to the utilization rate, vt, and is given by
δ[vt(j)] = δ0 + δ1(vt(j) − 1) +
δ2
2
(vt(j) − 1)
2, (10)
where δ0, δ1,a n dδ2 are calibrated parameters.2
The budget constraint for non-saver j ∈ (1 − μ,1], who does not have access to asset
markets, is
c
N
t (j)=( 1− τ
L
t )
 1
0
Wt( )
P − t
 
N
t (j, )d  + zt(j). (11)
Aggregate demand for labor services is not biased toward a certain labor type, A.T h e r e -
fore, in equilibrium the total supply of labor services by savers and non-savers is identical.
Speciﬁcally, LS
t (j)=LN
t (j)=
 1
0  t( )d  ≡ Lt. A labor clearinghouse purchases the diﬀer-
entiated labor inputs and groups them in order to generate a composite labor service, Lt,
according to the following CES production function
Lt =
 1
0
lt(l)
1
1+ηw
t dl
1+ηw
t
, (12)
where ηw
t denotes a time-varying exogenous markup to wages. Maximizing proﬁts for a given
level of labor yields the following demand function for a particular labor input
lt(l)=L
d
t

Wt(l)
Wt
	−
1+ηw
t
ηw
t
, (13)
where Ld
t represents the demand for composite labor services and ψw ≡ (1 + ηw
t )/ηw
t is the
elasticity of substitution between inputs.
The production sector consists of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods pro-
ducing ﬁrms who produce a continuum of diﬀerentiated inputs and a representative ﬁnal
goods producing ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm i ∈ [0,1] in the intermediate goods sector produces a
diﬀerentiated good, yt(i), with identical technologies given by
yt(i)=u
a
t(vtkt−1(i))
α( t(i))
1−α(K
G
t−1)
αG
, (14)
where kt(i)a n d t(i) denote the capital stock and level of employment used by ﬁrm i,
α ∈ [0,1] is the cost share of capital, and αG is the elasticity of output with respect to the
2δ1 is calibrated so that v = 1 in steady-state. The parameter ψ ∈ [0,1) is deﬁned so that δ  (1)/δ (1) =
δ2/δ1 ≡ ψ/(1 − ψ).
6stock of government capital KG
t−1.
A representative ﬁnal goods producing ﬁrm purchases inputs from the intermediate goods
producing ﬁrms in order to produce a composite good, Yt, according to the CES technology
Yt =
 1
0
yt(i)
1
1+ηp
t di
1+η
p
t
, (15)
where η
p
t denotes an exogenous time-varying markup to the intermediate goods’ prices. Max-
imizing proﬁts for a given level of output yields ﬁrm i’s demand function for intermediate
inputs
yt(i)=Yt

¯ pt(i)
¯ P
	−
1+ηp
t
ηp
t , (16)
where ¯ pt is the price of intermediate good i, ¯ Pt is the price of the ﬁnal good, and ψp ≡
(1 + η
p
t)/η
p
t is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
Both wages and prices adjust according to a Calvo pricing mechanism. Each period, a
union has the opportunity to adjust the nominal wage rate with probability (1 − ωw). In
the event that the union does not receive a pricing signal, wages are indexed to inﬂation
according to the rule
Wt(l)=Wt−1(l)π
χw
t−1, (17)
where χw parameterizes the degree of wage indexation. If, on the other hand, a union is
fortunate enough to be able to freely adjust the nominal wage rate, it chooses the optimal
wage rate, 
 Wt( ), to maximize the lifetime utility of households given by
Et
∞ 
i=0
(βωw)
i

u
b
t+i

(1 − μ)
(cS
t+i)1−γ − 1
1 − γ
+ μ
(cN
t+i)1−γ − 1
1 − γ
−
L
1+κ
t+i
1+κ

, (18)
subject to the aggregate budget constraints for both savers and non-savers and the individual
and aggregate labor demand functions. In a symmetric equilibrium, where 
 Wt( )=
 Wt,t h e
aggregate nominal wage is
Wt =

(1 − ωw)
 W
− 1
ηw
t + ωw(π
w
t−1)
−
χw
ηw
t W
− 1
ηw
t
t−1
−ηw
t
, (19)
where πw
t = Wt/Wt−1 is the gross wage inﬂation rate.
Similarly, each intermediate goods producing ﬁrm may reset its price only with probabil-
7ity (1−ωp) in any given period. Firms that are unable to make optimal adjustments simply
index their price level to past inﬂation by setting
¯ pt(i)=¯ pt−1(i)¯ π
χp
t−1, (20)
where χw parameterizes the degree of price indexation. Firms that are able to make opti-
mal adjustments to their price level choose their price level, ¯ pt(i), to maximize the sum of
discounted future proﬁts. In a symmetric equilibrium, where ¯ pt(i)=¯ pt, the producer price
index, ¯ Pt, evolves according to
¯ Pt =

(1 − ωp)¯ p
− 1
ηp
t
t + ωp¯ π
−
χp
ηp
t
t−1 ¯ P
− 1
ηp
t
t−1
−η
p
t
. (21)
The ﬁscal authority ﬁnances government consumption, Gt, government investment, GI
t,
and government transfers, Zt, through proportional taxes levied against consumption, labor
income, and capital returns and by issuing one-period nominal debt. The government’s ﬂow
budget constraint is
Bt + τ
K
t
RK
t
Pt
vtKt−1 + τ
L
t
Wt
Pt
Lt +
τC
t
1+τC
t
Ct =
Rt−1Bt−1
πt
+ Gt + G
l
t + Zt. (22)
Productive government capital evolves according to
K
G
t =( 1− δ
G)K
G
t−1 + G
I
t. (23)
Fiscal variables are governed by the following processes
ˆ τ
K
t = ρKˆ τ
K
t−1 +( 1− ρK)

ϕK ˆ Yt + γKˆ s
b
t−1

+ φKLσLε
L
t +
q 
i=0
θ
K
i εK,t−i (24)
ˆ τ
L
t = ρLˆ τ
L
t−1 +( 1− ρL)

ϕLˆ Yt + γLˆ s
b
t−1

+ φKLσKε
K
t +
q 
i=0
θ
L
i εL,t−i (25)
ˆ Gt = ρG ˆ Gt−1 − (1 − ρG)γGˆ s
b
t−1 + σGε
G
t +
q 
i=0
θ
G
i εG,t−i (26)
ˆ G
I
t = ρGI ˆ G
I
t−1 − (1 − ρGI)γGIˆ s
b
t−1 + σGIε
GI
t (27)
ˆ Zt = ρZ ˆ Zt−1 − (1 − ρZ)γZˆ s
b
t−1 + σZε
Z
t (28)
ˆ τ
C
t = ρCˆ τ
C
t−1 + σCε
C
t , (29)
8where sb
t−1 ≡ Bt−1/Yt−1 and εs
t ∼ i.i.d. N(0,1) for s ∈{ K,L,GC,GI,C,Z}.
The monetary authority sets interest rate policy according to the following Taylor-type
rule
ˆ Rt = ρr ˆ Rt−1 +( 1− ρr)

φπˆ πt + φy ˆ Yt

+ σ
m 
m
t , 
m
t ∼ N(0,1), (30)
so that the nominal interest rate adjusts in response to ﬂuctuations in both output and
inﬂation.
For a generic variable xt, its aggregate counterpart is given by Xt. Aggregate consump-
tion, which is composed of consumption by both savers and non-savers is given by
Ct =
 1
0
ct(j)dj =( 1− μ)c
S
t + μc
N
t .
Lump-sum transfers are identical across households so that
Zt =
 1
0
zt(j)dj = zt.
Since non-savers do not have access to asset markets, the aggregate levels of bonds, invest-
ment, capital, and dividends are given by
Bt =
 1
0
bt(j)dj =( 1− μ)bt,K t =
 1
0
kt(j)dj =( 1− μ)kt,
It =
 1
0
it(j)dj =( 1− μ)it,D t =
 1
0
dt(j)dj =( 1− μ)dt.
The remaining exogenous disturbances follow AR(1) processes given by
ˆ u
x
t = ρxˆ u
x
t−1 + σxε
x
t,ε
x
t ∼ N(0,1), 0 <ρ x < 1
for x ∈{ b,i,w,p,a}. To close the model, the aggregate resource constraint is
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + G
I
t. (31)
3 Identification of Fiscal Foresight
One of the main contributions of the paper is the identiﬁcation of ﬁscal foresight through
various empirical sources. We back out foresight with respect to changes in tax policy via the
municipal bond market. We use data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and Ramey
(2010) to identify foresight about government spending. Section 4 describes the mapping of
9the foresight into the DSGE model.
3.1 Identification of Tax Foresight If markets are eﬃcient, asset prices reﬂect all
information currently available to market participants, especially news concerning the future
paths of relevant variables. This hypothesis led Beaudry and Portier (2006) to include stock
prices in a VAR in order to capture agents’ expectations about future changes in productivity,
while Fisher and Peters (2009) use stock prices to identify news about government spending.
Due to the preferential tax treatment of municipal bonds, ﬁnancial variables can also be
used to extract the degree of tax foresight.
In the United States, municipal bonds are exempt from federal taxes.3 The diﬀerential
treatment of municipal and treasury bonds has useful implications for identifying news about
tax changes. If YM
t is the yield on a municipal bond at t and Yt the yield on a taxable bond,
and assuming the bonds have the same term to maturity, callability, market risk, credit
risk, and so forth, then an “implicit tax rate” is given by τI
t =1−Y M
t /Yt. This is the
tax rate at which the investor is indiﬀerent between the tax-exempt and taxable bond. If
participants in the municipal bond market are forward looking, the implicit tax rate should
predict subsequent movements in individual tax rates.4
Newly issued tax-exempt bonds with maturity T, a par value of $1, and per-period
coupon payments, CM, will sell at par if
1=
CM
T
t=1(1 + Rτ
t)t +
1
(1 + Rτ
T)T , (32)
where Rτ
t is the after-tax nominal interest rate for after-tax payments made in period t.N o
arbitrage conditions imply that a taxable bond with a similar maturity structure, paying
coupon, C, and selling at par will satisfy
1=
T
t=1 C(1 − τe
t )
T
t=1(1 + Rτ
t)t +
1
(1 + Rτ
T)T , (33)
where τe
t is the future tax rate expected to hold in period t.
If bonds sell at par, then the yield-to-maturity is equal to the coupon payments. There-
fore, the implicit tax rate at time T is given by τI
T =1−CM/C. Subtracting (33)f r o m( 32)
3Depending upon the type of bond, municipal bonds can also be exempt from the Alternative Minimum
Tax, state, and local taxes. See Ang, Bhansali, and Xing (2010) for a thorough description of the municipal
bond market.
4Several papers, using event study methodology, document the ability of the municipal bond market
to forecast changes in ﬁscal policy [see, Poterba (1989), Fortune (1996), Park (1997), Richter and Walker
(2009)].
10and solving for CM/C gives
1 − τ
I
T =
T 
t=1
ωt(1 − τ
e
t ), (34)
where ωt = δt/
T
t=1 δt and δt =( 1+Rτ
t)−t. Because the ω weights sum to unity, the implicit
tax rate at T is the weighted average of discounted expected future tax rates from t =1
to T. We can use this expression to back out the average expected future tax rate between
periods s and t given by
τ
e
s,t =
τI
t
t
i=1 δi − τI
s
s
i=1 δi t
j=s+1δi
. (35)
As described in Kochin and Parks (1988), the forward tax rate for the interval between
periods s and t is a weighted average of the forward tax rates for that interval, with weights
equal to the normalized discount factors for payments in that interval. In an environment
with no change in tax policy and perfect information, we would expect these rates to be
similar across maturity lengths.
Given that we have bond yields at various maturity lengths (see the data description
in Appendix D), it is possible to use the municipal bond yield curve as a measure of the
expected path of tax rates. Implicit tax rates over two diﬀerent maturity lengths yield a
time series of implied forward tax rates. Figures 1 and 2 plot the path of expected future
tax rates for bonds with maturity lengths of 1 and 5 years from 1954 to 2005. The shaded
regions correspond to the total legislative lags, documented in Yang (2007).5 Substantial
movements in the implicit forward tax rates that occur within the shaded regions indicate
that there is signiﬁcant news about future tax policy that arrives before the legislation is
passed. In principle, this news provides agents with some degree of tax foresight.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 provides the clearest example of the information content of
implicit forward tax rates.6 Over a 1-year time horizon, the response is relatively small, since
the policy was phased in over several years. However, average expected future tax rates over
a ﬁve-year time horizon correspond perfectly to the legislative lag, as the peak expectation
coincides with the announcement of the policy and the trough expectation coincides with the
implementation of the legislation. By the time the tax reform actually took eﬀect, agents
had factored the entire eﬀect of the policy into their expectations of taxes over the next ﬁve
years. Although not all tax events are well aligned with agents’ expectations, over shorter
5Note that the diﬀerences in shading have no meaning except to diﬀerentiate between tax events.
6This outcome is not surprising, given Auerbach and Slemrod’s (1997) evidence of how economic behavior
adjusted during the long legislative and implementation processes associated with this act.
11time horizons implicit forward tax rates are generally far more responsive to proposed tax
legislation than over longer time horizons.
One potential reason why the implicit tax rates do not correspond one-for-one with
changes in tax policy is because risk must be taken into account when constructing the yield
spreads between treasuries and municipal bonds. Diﬀerences in credit risk, call features,
duration, underlying collateral, etc. all imply that investors would require a premium for
holding municipal bonds. Fortune (1996) introduces a time-invariant “quality premium”,
θ, in the relationship between yields on municipal bonds and treasuries. The risk-adjusted
implicit tax rate is then
τ
RI
t =1−
YM
t + θ
Yt
. (36)
In order to determine how well the risk-adjusted implicit tax rate forecasts changes in
tax rates, we follow Fortune (1996) in constructing an ex-post tax rate. Let τt+i denote
the representative agent’s tax rate in period t + i. Given that coupons are typically paid
semi-annually, we construct a series of future tax rates at a semi-annual frequency given by
τt+6,τ t+12,τ t+18,...,τt+6n, with t being the spot date and n the number of semiannual periods
to maturity. The ex-post tax rates given by
Tt =
N 
i=1
ωiτt+6i
are constructed from the known statutory tax rates over the period to maturity, where the
weights are deﬁned as above.
To determine how well municipal bonds forecast changes in tax rates, Fortune decomposes
the ex-post tax rate into a convex combination of the risk-adjusted implicit tax rate, τRI
t ,
and the spot tax rate, τt, along with a forecast error to obtain
Tt = α
τ
1τ
RI
t +( 1− α
τ
1)τt + εt. (37)
The optimal weight given to each component depends upon the degree to which that compo-
nent helps in predicting changes in ex-post tax rates. Let ζτRI denote the forecast error from
predicting changes in the ex-post tax rate, conditioning on the risk-adjusted implicit tax
rate, ζτRI = Tt−τRI
t .L e tζτ denote the forecast error from predicting changes in the ex-post
tax rate, conditioning on the spot tax rate alone, ζτ = Tt −τt. The composite forecast error
is given by the convex combination of the two, εt = ατ
1ζτRI +(1−ατ
1)ζτ. The optimal weight,
12α1, is chosen so as to minimize the variance of the forecast error. This weight is given by
α
τ
1 =
σ2
ζτ
σ2
ζτ + σ2
ζτRI
, (38)
where σ2
ζτ and σ2
ζτRI are the variances of the forecast errors ζτ and ζτRI, respectively. Thus,
more weight is given to the variable that has the smaller forecast error variance. For example,
if agents have perfect foresight (that is, if agents knew exactly what their tax rates were
going to be through period N) and markets are eﬃcient, the variance of the forecast error
conditional on the implicit tax rate, σ2
ζτRI, would be zero and ατ
1 would be set to unity.
Substituting (36)i n t o( 37) and re-arranging gives
Tt − τt = α
τ
1(τ
I
t − τt)+α
τ
2(1/Yt)+εt, (39)
where ατ
1 measures the information content of municipal bonds and ατ
2 = −ατ
1θ measures
the risk premium.
Table 1 displays the results of the estimation of (39) using marginal income tax rates for
married individuals ﬁling joint returns collected from Internal Revenue Service publications
and the Tax Policy Center. The series of actual and ex-post tax rates were constructed using
the maximum tax rates and marginal tax rates for investors earning $100,000, $75,000, and
$50,000 annually in constant 1980 dollars. The yields to maturity are taken from tax-exempt
prime-grade general-obligation municipal bonds obtained from Salomon Brothers’ Analytical
Record of Yields and Yield Spreads for maturity lengths of 1, 5 and 10 years.7 As the table
reports, the information parameter, ατ
1, is of the correct sign and statistically signiﬁcant for
all maturity lengths and income groups, suggesting that the information parameter contains
relevant news about future tax rates. Not surprisingly, the information content of implicit
tax rates is greatest for agents who face the highest marginal tax rates. The risk premium
parameter, ατ
2, is also positive across most maturity lengths.
In order to capture the time varying nature of the information content contained in
municipal bonds and allow for time-varying risk premia, Fortune (1996) estimates a version
of (39) in which the coeﬃcients vary with time according to a random walk speciﬁcation
given by
α
τ
j,t = α
τ
j,t−1 + ηt,j =1 ,2,η ∼ N(0,Δ
2). (40)
7Following Fortune (1996), we also include a dummy variable for the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA). This
dummy variable is included to account for the signiﬁcant change in the market structure of the municipal
bond market caused by the TRA (see Richter and Walker (2009)).
13The standard deviation of the information parameter and risk premium will give an indication
of the amount of time variation in these parameters. Equations (39)a n d( 40) form a state-
space representation for which the Kalman ﬁlter can be used to estimate the model.
Table 2 reports the estimation allowing for time-varying parameter values. Notice that
the standard deviation is largest for the information parameter (δ1). This suggests that the
information content of municipal bonds, and hence foresight with respect to tax policy, is very
much a time-varying process. Figure 4, which plots the predicted path of the information
parameter, based on the marginal tax rate for an individual earning $75,000 in constant 1980
dollars, also demonstrates this point. For the decade of the 1970s, the information contained
in municipal bonds is nearly negligible relative to the 1980s. The spikes in the information
parameter correspond to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act
of 1986.
3.2 Identification of Government Spending Foresight To identify foresight with
respect to government spending, we follow Ramey (2010) in using the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The data we
examine are mean forecasts of real federal government consumption and gross investment
from 1981Q1 to 2010Q1 over one, two, three, four, and ﬁve quarter horizons. Data on quar-
terly nominal federal government consumption and gross investment spending from 1981Q1
to 2010Q1 are obtained from the National Income and Product Accounts, published by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). A real series of federal government consumption
expenditures and gross investment in chained 2005 dollars (RGFED) was generated using
the component-speciﬁc real GDP quantity index (QI) [BEA Table 1.1.3, line 22] and an-
nual component-speciﬁc nominal GDP (NGFED) [BEA Table 1.1.5, line 22]. Appendix D
contains a complete description of the data.
Ramey (2010) (and references therein) provides ample empirical evidence for foresight
with respect to government spending. Among other tests, she ﬁnds that one- and four-quarter
ahead Professional Forecasts Granger cause VAR shocks. Using data from 1939 to 2008, she
also ﬁnds that a “defense news” variable corresponding to major war dates has signiﬁcant
explanatory power in forecasting changes in government and defense spending. Figure 3 plots
real government spending along with Ramey’s war dates. As is evident from this picture,
defense news is predominately followed by stark changes in government consumption and
investment expenditures.
Similar to the analysis for tax foresight, we assume that forecasts of government spending
14can be decomposed into two components,
Gt+j = α
G
t Gt+j|t +( 1− α
G
t )ρ
j
GGt + εt for j =1 ,...,5 (41)
α
G
t = α
G
t−1 + η
G
t ,η ∼ N(0,Δ
2). (42)
The ﬁrst component, Gt+j|t, is the SPF forecast of government spending at time t + j
conditional on time t information. The SPF provides forecasts for real government spending 1
through 5 quarters ahead. The second component assumes an AR(1) process for government
spending similar to (5). We ﬁt the AR(1) model to the real government spending series
described in Appendix D. Analogous to the tax foresight case and (38), αG will be determined
by whichever forecast has the smaller forecast error variance. Speciﬁcation (41) implicitly
assumes that forecasts from the SPF contain more information about changes in government
spending than can be extracted from in-sample AR(1) forecasting rules.
As with tax foresight, we allow the information parameter for government spending
to be a time-varying process. Figure 5 plots the αG
t parameter for j =1 ,2,3 from 1980
through 2009. The estimation reveals that news about government spending is also a time-
varying process. The increase in the information parameter throughout the decade of 2000
is consistent with the increase in the frequency of defense spending events documented by
Ramey, ﬁgure 3.
4 Mapping of News into DSGE Models
There are two dimensions to ﬁscal foresight—horizon and intensity. A foresight horizon
measures how far in advance agents are aware of potential changes to ﬁscal policy. Foresight
intensity measures how conﬁdent agents are about pending changes to ﬁscal variables.
As an example of a foresight horizon, consider changes to the tax code. The foresight
horizon would include both the legislative lag, the time when legislation is ﬁrst proposed, and
the implementation lag—and could be much longer than the sum of the two lags. For example
leading up to the 1980 presidential election, then candidate Reagan made a campaign promise
to overhaul the tax code if elected. Even though a low probability event at the time, agents
would have placed positive probability on a decrease in tax rates, which would have preceded
the legislative lag by several years.
An example of foresight intensity pertaining to government spending is the recently en-
acted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Prior to the passage of the bill,
agents did not know the size or composition of the anticipated government spending. Table
3 taken from Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010) contains the Congressional Budget Oﬃce’s
estimates of costs and outlays associated with two pieces of legislation involving government
15investment. Based on historical spending rates, the CBO assumes that outlays for govern-
ment investment take place over several years following the authorization. For the ARRA,
Congress authorized $27.5 billion for highway construction in 2009, yet the estimated outlays
are only $2.75 billion for ﬁscal year 2009. Another example is the National Highway Bridge
Reconstruction and Inspection Act of 2008, which was not enacted but would have autho-
rized appropriations of about $1 billion in ﬁscal year 2009 for repairing, rehabilitating, and
replacing bridges on public roadways. Outlays associated with this legislation were planned
to extend more than four years into the future. Due to the diﬀerences between outlays and
authorized spending, agents have a precise measure of the projected increase in government
spending that can be attributed to the ARRA over the next several years.
To map the degree of ﬁscal foresight into the DSGE models, we calibrate the moving-
average coeﬃcients in the tax and government spending processes to match the foresight
intensity and horizon of several episodes in recent U.S. history. As an illustrative example
of this mapping, consider the following moving-average representation for tax rates
τt = εt−1 − θεt. (43)
If |θ| < 1, then (43) is a non-fundamental moving-average representation, and the space
spanned by current and past tax rates {τt−j}∞
j=0 is smaller than the space spanned by the
structural innovations, {εt−j}∞
j=0.
One consequence of this result is that the variance of the one-step-ahead forecast error
for agents conditioning on structural innovatio n si ss m a l l e rt h a nt h ef o recast error variance
for agents conditioning only on current and past tax rates. To show this analytically, we
must derive the Wold representation of (43), which is given by8
τt =˜ εt − θ˜ εt−1 (44)
˜ εt =

L − θ
1 − θL

εt. (45)
Representation (44) shows that current and past τt span an equivalent space to current and
past ˜ εt, which is a strictly smaller space than εt. The variance of the one-step-ahead forecast
error using representation (44)i sg i v e nb y
E{τt+1 − E[τt+1|{τt−j}
∞
j=0]}
2 = σ
2
˜ ε = σ
2
ε, (46)
where the last equality follows because the term, L−θ
1−θL, known as a Blaschke factor, has unit
8See Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009) for a more detailed derivation.
16modulus (see Lippi and Reichlin (1994)) and hence var(εt)=var(˜ ε)=σ2
ε.
Suppose now that agents are able to condition on current and past structural innovations
directly. These agents are able to use (43) to forecast next period’s tax rate. The variance
of the forecast error for this process is given by
E{τt+1 − E[τt+1|{εt−j}
∞
j=0]}
2 = θ
2σ
2
ε. (47)
Comparing this forecast error variance with (46) shows that the MA coeﬃcient, θ, deter-
mines the degree to which agents conditioning on the structural shocks are better informed.
As θ → 0, agents who observe the structural innovations have perfect one-step-ahead fore-
sight in the sense that they observe εt = τt+1 and the corresponding forecast error is zero.
As θ → 1, the information sets and the variance of forecast errors converge. Therefore,
calibrating the moving-average parameter, θ, is tantamount to calibrating agents’ foresight
intensity.
We are then able to back out the corresponding MA coeﬃcients by equating the variance
of the forecast errors from the DSGE model with the reduced form estimates from section
3. Note that the reduction in the variance of the forecast error by conditioning on the
risk-adjusted implicit tax rate is given by the ratio
E{τt+1 − E[τt+1|{τt−j}∞
j=0]}2
E{τt+1 − E[τt+1|{τt−j}∞
j=0,{τRI
t−j}∞
j=0]}2 =
σ2
ζτ
α2σ2
ζτRI +( 1− α)2σ2
ζτ
=( 1− α)
−1. (48)
Our deﬁnition of foresight equates conditioning on the implicit tax rate in section 3 with
conditioning on the structural shocks in the DSGE models. Therefore, the mapping between
the information parameter, α, and the MA coeﬃcient, θ, is determined by
E{τt+1 − E[τt+1|{τt−j}∞
j=0,{τRI
t−j}∞
j=0]}2
E{τt+1 − E[τt+1|{τt−j}∞
j=0]}2 =1− α = θ
2 =
E{τt+1 − E[τt+1|{εt−j}∞
j=0]}2
E{τt+1 − E[τt+1|{τt−j}∞
j=0]}2.
(49)
As the implicit tax rate becomes a perfect predictor of future tax changes α → 1, which
delivers θ → 0, implying perfect one-step-ahead foresight. Therefore, estimates of the infor-
mation parameters ατ
1 and αG
1 will pin down the foresight intensity—the reduction in the
forecast error variance due to ﬁscal foresight.
Foresight horizon is derived through altering the functional form of the MA represen-
tation. For example, if agents have two quarters of foresight, then the ﬁscal rules must
have two MA coeﬃcients, τt = θ0εt − θ1εt−1 − εt−2 =( L − ξ1)(L − ξ2)εt with |ξi| < 1
for i =1 ,2. The one– and two-step-ahead forecast errors must now be used to pin down
17the MA coeﬃcients. As with the previous example, the forecast error associated with the
information set {τt−j}∞
j=0 is derived by ﬂipping the zeros outside the unit circle so that
τt =( 1− ξ1L)(1 − ξ2L)˜ εt,w h e r e˜ εt =( L − ξ1)(L − ξ2)/(1 − ξ1L)(1 − ξ2L). The ratio of the
variance of the one– and two-step-ahead forecast errors are given by
E{τt+1 − E[τt+1|{εt−j}∞
j=0]}2
E{τt+1 − E[τt+1|{τt−j}∞
j=0]}2 = θ
2
0,
E{τt+2 − E[τt+2|{εt−j}∞
j=0]}2
E{τt+2 − E[τt+2|{τt−j}∞
j=0]}2 =( 1− θ1)
2.
The MA coeﬃcients are now uniquely determined by matching the forecast error variance
derived above to the ατ
i and αG
i for i =1 ,2. Thus, by observing the structural shocks, agents
will have knowledge about tax rates two quarters in advance. Three quarters of foresight
require three MA coeﬃcients, and so on.
We normalize the MA coeﬃcients to sum to unity. This normalization yields the in-
terpretation of MA coeﬃcients as relative weights that dictate the importance of news at
diﬀerent horizons. For example, the MA coeﬃcient for the process,
τt = θεt−1 +( 1− θ)εt−2, (50)
determines the importance of news one quarter ahead versus two quarters ahead. As θ → 1,
agents have perfect foresight one period ahead and as θ → 0, agents have perfect foresight
two periods ahead.
In order to capture the time varying nature of news, we examine two diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions of news for both the government spending and the tax processes. We refer to these
speciﬁcations as “high degree of foresight,” “medium degree of foresight”, and “low degree
of foresight.” The moving-average components for the quarterly news processes are:
Tax Foresight
• High Degree: 0.12εi
t +0 .05εi
t−1 +0 .09εi
t−2 +0 .2εi
t−3 +0 .4εi
t−4 +0 .14εi
t−5
• Medium Degree: 0.33εi
t +0 .32εi
t−1 +0 .35εi
t−2
• Low Degree: 0.47εi
t +0 .53εi
t−1
for i ∈{ L,K}.
Government Spending
• High Degree: 0.11εG
t +0 .31εG
t−1 +0 .27εG
t−2 +0 .28εG
t−3 +0 .02εG
t−4 +0 .01εG
t−5
• Low Degree: 0.59εG
t +0 .24εG
t−1 +0 .09εG
t−2 +0 .08εG
t−3
18These processes are calibrated to ﬁt U.S. data. We calibrate the high degree of tax
foresight speciﬁcation using data from the 1980s. The 1980s was a high news decade because
of two major changes to the tax code—the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (HR 4242)
and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (HR 4170). Both bills implemented major changes to the
tax code and had an average legislative lag of well over a year [Yang (2007)]. To calibrate
the high degree of tax foresight, we average the information parameter for municipal bond
yields of 1 and 5 year horizons given by Figure 4 over the decade of the 1980s as a measure
of foresight intensity. We then use the legislative lags associated with tax changes in the
1980s provided by Yang (2007) to specify the functional form of the MA processes. This
speciﬁcation yields 5 quarters of foresight, which is a conservative estimate because both
pieces of legislation were phased in over several years.
The medium and low degrees of tax foresight are calibrated to match the data from the
1970s and 1990s, respectively. There were several changes to the tax code in the 1970s—
Revenue Act of 1971, Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Tax Reduction and Simpliﬁcation Act of 1977 and the Revenue Act of
1978. Most of these were relatively minor compared to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and, as
evidenced by Figure 4, the information content of municipal bonds was, on average, smaller
than for the 1980s. Conversely, the information contained in the municipal bonds from 1990
through 2001 is nearly zero. For both medium and low degrees of foresight, we assume agents
have three quarters of foresight. This speciﬁcation matches the legislative lags for the major
tax changes over these two decades as recorded by Yang (2007).
For government spending foresight, we use two speciﬁcations of news—high and low.
The high news period is calibrated to match the data from 2000 through 2009. As shown in
Figure 5, the information content of the SPF’s forecasts for changes in government spending
at 1, 2 and 3 quarters ahead is highest during this decade. This corresponds nicely to the
narrative approach of Ramey (2009) given by ﬁgure 3. The 2000s contained many defense
spending increases: [i] 2002Q1, the Bush administration calls for an increase in the Pentagon
budget over the next 5 years; [ii] 2002Q3, Announced increases in the Department of Defense
budget over the next 10 years to deal with counter-terrorism eﬀorts and the response to 9/11;
[iii] Several increases in spending to ﬁnance the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The low degree of foresight is an average of the information parameter, αG
1 , for 1980
through 2000. The functional form of the government spending process assumes three-
quarter-ahead foresight, which is less than the maximum provided by the SPF of ﬁve. We
specify only three quarters of foresight because the four- and ﬁve-step-ahead forecasts where
given nearly zero weight in the estimation of (41).
195 Implications of Fiscal Foresight
Direct evidence of the degree of ﬁscal foresight—whether it is from the narrative studies
of Romer and Romer (2010) and Ramey (2009, 2010), the regressions of Fortune (1996),
or the tax chronology of Yang (2007)—makes it clear that the degree of foresight varies
substantially across time. While some ﬁscal events are almost wholly surprises, others are
years in the making [Steigerwald and Stuart (1997), Romer and Romer (2007)]. At odds with
this evidence, formal empirical work on ﬁscal foresight tends to impose time-invariant degrees
of foresight, ﬁxing ap r i o r ithe horizon over which ﬁscal events are known [Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Mertens and Ravn (2008, 2009)]. This section
explores, in the context of the two DSGE models, how diﬀerent assumptions about the degree
of ﬁscal foresight and the nature of the ﬁscal news processes alter the models’ predictions of
the impacts of anticipated ﬁscal changes. With the exception of the ﬁscal news processes,
parameters in both models are set at the values estimated or calibrated by Braun (1994),
reported in appendix C.1, and Traum and Yang (2009), reported in appendix C.2.
Results in this section employ the estimated ﬁscal rules in the two models: equations
(3)–(5) for the RBC model and equations (24)–(28) for the NK model. In what follows,
we use values for the moving-average coeﬃcients in the rules—the θ’s—and trace out the
implications of values of the coeﬃcients that coincide with diﬀerent degrees of ﬁscal foresight.
Figures 6–8 report responses of consumption, output, employment, and investment in the
RBC model to changes in labor taxes, capital taxes, and government spending. Solid black
lines correspond to responses reported in Braun’s (1994) original paper to unanticipated
changes in ﬁscal instruments. The other three lines are associated with a high degree of
foresight (heavy dotted-dashed line), a medium degree (light dotted-dashed line), and a
low degree (dashed line). Relative to a surprise tax increase, foresight about higher labor
taxes induces agents to increase their work eﬀort, production, and savings before the higher
tax rate is realized, allowing them to smooth their consumption paths [ﬁgure 6]. With a
suﬃciently high degree of foresight, these variables even increase during the anticipation
period.9 A high degree of foresight with respect to labor taxes in the model of Braun leads
to qualitative diﬀerences in output, employment and investment. This is especially true for
investment due to the the double taxation of capital income. The investment response on
impact in the model with no foresight is -0.6% lower on impact. Even the low degree of
foresight case implies an impact eﬀect of a decrease in investment of only -0.18% on impact,
and with a high degree of foresight, investment increases to 0.1%.
Capital taxes operate on the agents’ intertemporal savings margin, which ampliﬁes the
9This counterintuitive short-run response to a tax hike is likely to cause problems for identiﬁcation schemes
that rely on certain classes of sign restrictions.
20impacts of anticipated increases [ﬁgure 7]. Output, employment, and investment exhibit
their largest movements over the foresight horizon. As the degree of foresight increases, and
this trough is pushed out in time, these variables can exhibit “hump-like” responses even in
the absence of any frictions, such as habit formation and adjustment costs, that are typically
introduced into DSGE model to produce humps. This outcome echoes a point made by
Leeper and Walker (2010) that news processes can in themselves constitute a propagation
mechanism.
Figure 8 displays the usual result that higher government spending crowds out private
consumption. Government spending carries with it an expectation of higher taxes that reduce
wealth, encouraging more work eﬀort and raising output in the short run. While news alters
the quantitative details, it does not aﬀect the qualitative ﬁnding for consumption. News
does matter for inferences about whether government spending crowds out investment in
the short run. Foresight induces agents to save in anticipation of the eventual tax increase
and a high degree of foresight can have government spending crowd in investment during
the anticipation period, which produces a short-run U-shaped response in output. Again,
“hump-like” patterns emerge from the news process.
We now turn to the NK model. One important distinction between the RBC model
and the NK model is that the NK model has many frictions (e.g., investment adjustment
costs, monopolistically competitive intermediate goods and labor sectors, variable capital
utilization, etc.) built into the model in order to provide a tighter ﬁt to data. These
frictions serve to smooth out the response of agents to news about future changes to tax
rates and government spending. Figure 9 shows the response to a capital tax shock to the
NK model. Notice that relative to the RBC model, where most of the diﬀerence between
foresight and no foresight occurs in the ﬁrst 6 quarters, the diﬀerent responses of output,
investment, and aggregate consumption to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of news is nearly negligible
for the ﬁrst year. However, the impulse response functions of the RBC model converge more
quickly than do those of the NK model. In other words, the frictions of the NK model serve
to smooth the initial response of news shocks but also propagate their eﬀects.
To better understand how the frictions of the NK model interact with ﬁscal foresight,
we plot impulse response functions with speciﬁc frictions turned oﬀ. Figure 10 plots the
response of investment to a capital tax shock with investment adjustment costs and variable
capital utilization turned on (solid lines) and oﬀ (dashed lines). The diﬀerence between the
impulse responses for high foresight and no foresight is much larger when the frictions are
turned oﬀ. The intuition is straightforward: as adjustments to capital become less costly,
ﬁrms are able to respond much more to foresight about changes in tax rates.
Figure 11 shows the response to a one-percentage increase in labor taxes of employment
21given 18% of households are unable to save compared to an economy where every household
is able to save. Both responses assume agents have a high degree of foresight. The eﬀects
of foresight rely heavily on agents’ ability to intertemporally substitute. Knowledge of a
signiﬁcant increase in labor taxes in the future has a muted eﬀect for households that operate
hand-to-mouth. Figure 11 shows that as a signiﬁcant fraction of non-savers are added to the
economy, the overall response of employment is muted due to the inability to intertemporally
substitute.
In addition to the absence of frictions, the NK model diﬀers from the RBC model in
its speciﬁcation of ﬁscal ﬁnancing. In the RBC model, all ﬁscal ﬁnancing operates through
contemporaneous lump-sum taxes. The NK model, in contrast, initially uses debt ﬁnancing
of ﬁscal deﬁcits. Debt ﬁnancing, in turn, portends adjustments in a mix of future distorting
taxes, government spending, government investment, and transfer payments. These ad-
justments induce additional dynamics that add to the propagation of ﬁscal disturbances in
the NK model relative to the the RBC setup. They also have important consequences for
the impacts of varying degrees of ﬁscal news. Figure 12 shows that the eﬀect of government
spending foresight can have large eﬀects in the NK model. The black line shows the response
with no foresight to an increase in government consumption. The usual result follows: in-
vestment and consumption fall due to the government absorbing a larger share of goods,
while output increases. However with a high degree of foresight, output could fall in period
t as agents anticipate a much higher increase in government consumption in period t +3 .
This suggests that no-foresight impact multipliers would be positive, while the high-foresight
multipliers would be negative.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We ﬁnd that news concerning changes in ﬁscal policy is a time-varying process. There
are periods in which agents have many quarters of foresight (e.g., wars, signiﬁcant changes
to the tax code). Over the time horizon that we examine, these “high foresight” periods
are few and far between. Much of the data consist of medium to low or no foresight.
One consequence of this result is that models that do not take the time varying process of
information ﬂows into account will average away the eﬀects of news. These studies might
conclude that ﬁscal foresight is not relevant for explaining business cycle dynamics, but
these models will not be able to assess the eﬀects of ﬁscal foresight. We examined ﬁscal
foresight in Braun’s (1994) real business cycle model and Traum and Yang’s (2009) new
Keynesian model. We have shown how foresight interacts with common frictions imbedded in
models to better ﬁt data. Internal propagation mechanisms, such as investment adjustment
costs, are shown to propagate the eﬀects of foresight. We ﬁnd that ﬁscal foresight has
22both quantitative and qualitative short-run eﬀects in typical DSGE models. Alternative
news processes substantially alter equilibrium dynamics, underscoring the importance of
accurately characterizing the stochastic processes governing ﬁscal news.
23A Tables
Table 1: Linear Regression Model: Fixed Coeﬃcients
Tt − τt = α0 + α1(τI
t − τt)+α2(1/YM
t )+α3TRA86 + εt
1-Year 5-Year 10-Year
1965:1-1994:12 1965:1-1990:12 1965:1-1985:12
Max $100K $75K $50K Max $100K $75K $50k Max $100K $75K $50K
α0 0.008 -0.000 -0.006 -0.007 -0.066 -0.072 -0.070 -0.073 -0.039 -0.046 -0.068 -0.077
tα0 0.501 -0.036 -1.197 -1.153 -1.472 -2.003 -2.748 -1.865 -0.736 -1.072 -2.370 -1.677
α1 0.203 0.164 0.070 0.079 0.301 0.219 0.091 0.102 0.318 0.240 0.101 0.108
tα1 4.039 3.792 3.110 3.010 5.117 4.899 3.461 3.049 4.316 4.622 3.137 2.621
α2 0.073 0.051 0.022 0.022 0.246 0.190 0.080 0.090 0.134 0.081 0.038 0.072
tα2 1.555 1.549 1.180 1.060 1.264 1.341 1.030 0.906 0.423 0.354 0.293 0.427
α3 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.078 0.077 0.055 0.058 0.085 0.080 0.058 0.062
tα3 -0.152 0.169 0.446 0.071 2.922 3.894 4.930 4.075 2.936 3.753 4.706 3.864
DW 1.974 1.777 2.058 1.964 2.089 2.054 2.387 2.193 2.092 2.037 2.395 2.186
Q12 7.382 15.164 9.781 3.715 13.021 11.750 21.285 9.867 13.249 10.065 25.688 9.873
(0.831) (0.233) (0.635) (0.988) (0.368) (0.466) (0.046) (0.628) (0.351) (0.610) (0.012) (0.627)
Cochrane-Orcutt estimation was used in order to correct for serial correlation. The Box-Ljung
statistic (Q12) tests for serial correlation over a 12-quarter period. The corresponding p-value is
in parentheses. The correction was successful in all but two cases.
Table 2: Linear Regression Model: Variable Coeﬃcients
Tt − τt = α0,t + α1,t(τI
t − τt)+α2,t(1/Yt)+α3,tTRA86 + εt
αi,t = αi,t−1 + ηi,t ηt ∼ N(0,Δ2) εt ∼ N(0,σ 2)
1-Year 5-Year 10-Year
1965:1-1994:12 1965:1-1990:12 1965:1-1985:12
Max $100K $75K $50K Max $100K $75K $50k Max $100K $75K $50K
δ0 0.0001 0.0001 0.1468 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.2199 0.0097 0.0024 0.0001 0.2592 0.0014
δ1 1.0052 0.6311 0.8500 0.3797 0.6695 0.6058 1.0004 1.2521 2.7655 0.2542 2.0762 2.6473
δ2 0.1429 0.1232 0.0007 0.0001 0.0008 0.0005 0.0028 0.0008 18.6405 0.0006 0.0058 6.0488
δ3 0.0013 0.0022 0.0020 0.0023 0.0135 0.0123 0.0061 0.0068 0.0175 0.0160 0.0099 0.0087
σ 0.0253 0.0180 0.0117 0.0084 0.0528 0.0328 0.0416 0.0245 0.0756 0.0246 0.0255 0.0258
Maximum Likelihood estimation was used in order to obtain the standard errors of the transition
equation steps (square roots of the diagonal elements in Δ), δ0, δ1, δ2, δ3. All oﬀ diagonal entries
are assumed to be zero. The parameter σ is the standard deviation of the measurement equation.
24Table 3: Authorizations and Outlays for ARRA and NHBRIA
ARRA, Highway Construction in Title XII (billions)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2009-16
Budget Authority 27.5 00000002 7 .5
Estimated Outlay 2.75 6.875 5.54 .125 3.025 2.75 1.925 .55 27.5
National Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act (millions)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009-13
Budget Authority 1,0 2 9 5555 1 ,049
Estimated Outlay 280 425 169 56 46 976
Top panel: estimated costs in billions of dollars for highway construction in Title XII of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Bottom panel: estimated costs in millions
of dollars for the National Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act of 2008.
Source: Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010).
BF i g u r e s
Figure 1: Average Forward Tax Rates: 1-Year Time Horizon
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Shaded regions correspond to tax events documented in Yang (2009). Note that shading
diﬀerences are only intended to help diﬀerentiate between events.
25Figure 2: Average Forward Tax Rates: 5-Year Time Horizon
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diﬀerences are only intended to help diﬀerentiate between events.
Figure 3: Annual log deviations in real government consumption expenditures
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Shaded regions correspond to defense spending events documented in Ramey (2009). Note
that shading diﬀerences are only intended to help diﬀerentiate between events.
26Figure 4: Time-Varying Information Parameter ατ
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Figure 5: Time-Varying Information Parameter αG
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27B.1 Impulse Response Functions
B.1.1 RBC Model
Figure 6: Labor Tax Shock
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Response of a 1 percent increase in labor taxes. The solid black line corresponds to the
RBC model of Braun (1994) where agents have no foresight. The other responses corre-
spond to agents having a low degree of foresight (dashed blue line), a moderate degree of
foresight (dotted-dashed red line) and a high degree of foresight (heavy dotted dashed blue
line).
28Figure 7: Capital Tax Shock
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Response of a 1 percent increase in capital taxes. The solid black line corresponds to the
RBC model of Braun (1994) where agents have no foresight. The other responses corre-
spond to agents having a low degree of foresight (dashed blue line), a moderate degree of
foresight (dotted-dashed red line) and a high degree of foresight (heavy dotted dashed blue
line).
Figure 8: Government Spending Shock
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Response of a 1 percent increase in government spending. The solid black line corresponds
to the RBC model of Braun (1994) where agents have no foresight. The other responses
correspond to agents having a low degree of foresight (dashed blue line) and a high degree
of foresight (dotted dashed red line).
29B.1.2 New Keynesian Model
Figure 9: Capital Tax Shock
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New Keynesian model where agents have no foresight. The other responses correspond to
agents having a low degree of foresight (dashed blue line), a moderate degree of foresight
(light dotted dashed red line), and a high degree of foresight (heavy dotted dashed purple
line).
30Figure 10: Response of Investment to Capital Tax Shock
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Figure 11: Response of Employment to Labor Tax Shock
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Response of employment to a 1 percent increase in labor taxes assuming a high degree of
foresight. The solid black line corresponds to the NK model with no non-savers. The other
response assumes 18% of households are unable to save.
31Figure 12: Response to Government Spending Shock
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32C Parameter Values
This appendix reports the parameter values estimated or calibrated by Braun (1994) for the
real business cycle model and by Traum and Yang (2009) for the new Keynesian model.
C.1 RBC Model
Table 4: RBC Model Parameters
Baseline Calibration
Annual discount factor β 0.9709
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.0834
Government consumption preference parameter γ1 0.4
Government spending-to-output ratio G/Y 0.2
Implied Parameters
Nominal interest rate r 0.1390
Capital-to-output ratio K/Y 3.2366
Consumption-to-output ratio C/Y 0.6101
Private consumption-to-output ratio CP/Y 0.5301
Labor-to-output ratio N/Y 0.3825
Nominal wage rate W 1.4378
Transfers-to-output ratio TR/Y 0.0205
Investment-to-output ratio I/Y 0.2699
Estimated Parameters
Capital share θ 0.45
Leisure preference parameter γ2 4.21
State-state labor tax rate τL 0.25
State-state capital tax rate τK 0.281
Persistence of labor tax shock ρL 0.95
Persistence of capital tax shock ρK 0.786
Persistence of government spending shock ρ1
G 0.647
Persistence of growth shock ρλ 0.9
33C.2 New Keynesian Model
Table 5: New Keynesian Model Parameters
Baseline Calibration
Quarterly discount factor β 0.99
Capital share α 0.36
Private capital depreciation rate δ0 0.025
Government capital depreciation rate δG 0.02
Elasticity of substitution between labor inputs ψw 8
Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods ψp 8
Steady-state inﬂation rate π 1
Government consumption-to-output ratio sGC 0.0698
Government investment-to-output ratio sGI 0.00395
Quarterly debt-to-output ratio sb 1.5436
Steady-state labor tax rate τL 0.209
Steady-state capital tax rate τK 0.196
Steady-state consumption tax rate τC 0.0149
Elasticity of output with respect to public capital αG 0.05
Implied Parameters
Gross Nominal interest rate R 1.0101
Capital-to-output ratio K/Y 7.2152
Consumption-to-output ratio C/Y 0.7459
Labor-to-output ratio L/Y 0.3547
Nominal wage rate w 1.557
Transfers-to-output ratio sTR 0.0978
Savers consumption-to-output ratio CS/Y 0.7923
Non-savers consumption-to-output ratio CN/Y 0.5342
Steady-state output Y 1.9369
Estimated Parameters
Risk aversion γ 2.7
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor κ 2.1
Fraction of savers μ 0.18
Wage stickiness ωw 0.69
Price stickiness ωp 0.82
Capital utilization ψ 0.38
Investment adjustment costs s 7.4
(continued on next page)
34Wage partial indexation χw 0.39
Price partial indexation χp 0.31
Government consumption response to debt γGC 0.17
Government investment response to debt γGI 0.0033
Capital tax response to debt γK 0.17
Labor tax response to debt γL 0.16
Transfers response to debt γZ 0.074
Capital response to output ϕK 0.78
Labor response to output ϕL 0.43
Interest rate response to inﬂation φπ 1.9
Interest rate response to output φy 0.095
Lagged interest rate response ρr 0.86
Persistence of technology shock ρa 0.89
Persistence of preference shock ρb 0.94
Persistence of investment shock ρi 0.55
Persistence of wage markup shock ρw 0.3
Persistence of price markup shock ρp 0.34
Persistence of government consumption shock ρGC 0.96
Persistence of government investment shock ρGI 0.76
Persistence of capital tax shock ρK 0.89
Persistence of labor tax shock ρL 0.94
Persistence of consumption tax shock ρC 0.90
Persistence of transfers shock ρZ 0.79
Std. Dev of technology shock σa 0.64
Std. Dev of preference shock σb 2.4
Std. Dev of monetary policy shock σm 0.14
Std. Dev of investment shock σi 4.3
Std. Dev of wage markup shock σw 0.27
Std. Dev of price markup shock σp 0.19
Std. Dev of government consumption shock σGC 2.8
Std. Dev of government investment shock σGI 4
Std. Dev of capital tax shock σK 4.2
Std. Dev of labor tax shock σL 2.3
Std. Dev of consumption shock σC 3.3
Std. Dev of transfers shock σZ 2.6
Co-movement between capital and labor taxes φKL 0.23
D Data Description
D.1 Municipal Bonds We utilize municipal and Treasury bond data with maturity lengths of one,
ﬁve, and ten years. Yields to maturity from 1954M1 to 1994M12 on tax-exempt prime-grade general-
35obligation municipal bonds are obtained from Salomon Brothers’ Analytical Record of Yields and Yield
Spreads. Salomon Brothers’ municipal data are collected on bonds of various maturity lengths on the ﬁrst
of each month and based on estimates of the yields of new issues sold at face value. Yields on similarly-rated
(AAA) municipal bonds from 1995M1-2006M12 are obtained from Bloomberg’s Municipal Fair Market Bond
Index. Market yields on constant-maturity-adjusted, non-inﬂation-indexed U.S. Treasury securities from
1954M1-2006M12 are obtained from the Federal Reserve’s Statistical Release on Selected Interest Rates.
These yields reﬂect the average of the weekly values within each month, which are interpolated from the
daily yield curve.
D.2 Government Spending Data on quarterly nominal federal government consumption and gross
investment spending from 1981Q1 to 2010Q1 are obtained from the National Income and Product Accounts,
published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). A real series of federal government consumption
expenditures and gross investment in chained 2005 dollars (RGFED) was generated using the component-
speciﬁc real GDP quantity index (QI) [NIPA Table 1.1.3, line 22] and annual component-speciﬁc nominal
GDP (NGFED) [NIPA Table 1.1.5, line 22]. The following formula was applied in order to convert from
current dollars to chained 2005 dollars:
RGFED
Q
BY =

QI
Q
CY
QI
A
BY

NGFED
Q
BY,
where A and Q designate between annual and quarterly values and CY and BY denote current quarter and
base year (annual) values.
D.3 Survey of Professional Forecasters Mean forecasts of real federal government consumption
and gross investment from 1981Q1 to 2010Q1 over one, two, three, four, and ﬁve year horizons are taken
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Unfortunately, the published data is not provided under a constant base year and is aﬀected by several
changes in the base year set by the BEA. This creates two minor complications. First, the BEA does not
publish price indexes corresponding to historical base years. Second, the components of and the methodology
for collecting federal government spending data has changed over time. In the ﬁrst quarter of 1996, the
BEA’s price and quantity indexes switched to chain-weighted measures. Moreover, in the same quarter,
government purchases were replaced by government consumption and gross investment spending, which lead
to a substantial upward revision in the government component of GDP.10 These changes forced us to employ
two diﬀerent methods in order to transform this series of forecasts into constant 2005 dollars.
Between 1981Q1 and 1995Q4, we collect nominal government purchases (Table 1) and the component-
speciﬁc implicit price deﬂator (Table 7.1) from quarterly issues of the Survey of Current Business, which
were downloaded from the Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research. A time series of these
variables was created using the most recently revised estimates. Real forecasts were then converted to current
dollars by multiplying the quarterly real forecast by the quarterly implicit price deﬂator and dividing by
100. In order to account for the change in the deﬁnition of government spending, we collect current data
on nominal federal government consumption and gross investment and calculate the diﬀerence from the
past deﬁnition. We then scale up the calculated nominal forecasts in order to obtain government spending
10For more details surrounding the precise changes in the deﬁnition of government spending see the Survey
of Business issues from September 1995 and January 1996.
36Table 6: Base Years for NIPA Variables in the SPF
Range of Surveys Base Year
1996Q1 to 1999Q3 1992
1999Q4 to 2003Q4 1996
2004Q1 to 2009Q2 2000
2009Q3 to 2010Q1 2005
forecasts based on its new deﬁnition. Finally to convert these values into constant 2005 dollars, we multiply
by 100 and divide the corresponding quarterly implicit price deﬂator.
Between 1996Q1and 2010Q1, the data is ﬁrst convertedto current dollars by constructing the component-
speciﬁc implicit price deﬂator (IPD) in each of the relevant base years. In order to re-base the index, we
applied the following transformation
NIPD
Q
CY =
OIPD
A
CY
OIPD
A
NBY
,
where NIPD and OIPD correspond to the implicit price deﬂator series under the new and old base years
and NBY stands for the new (desired) base year. We then construct a new IPD series with base years
corresponding to the data speciﬁed in Table 6. Using the generated series, we obtain nominal forecasts by
multiplying each quarterly data point by the current implicit price deﬂator with the appropriate base year.
The constructed nominal series is then converted to constant 2005 dollars using the same procedure that
was applied to pre-1996 data.
D.4 Marginal Tax Rates Marginal income tax rates for married individuals ﬁling joint returns are
obtained from Internal Revenue Service publications and the Tax Policy Center. Following Fortune (1996),
marginal tax brackets, reported in current dollars, are converted to constant 1980 dollars using the implicit
price deﬂator [NIPA Table 1.1.9]. A series of actual and ex post tax rates are then constructed using the
maximum tax rates and the marginal tax rates for investors earning $100,000, $75,000, and $50,000 annually
in constant 1980 dollars. Annual tax rates are then applied to each month of each corresponding year.
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